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STATE LAW-UNIFORM ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT
ACT, WASH. REV. CODE CH. 70.96A (1974)-DECRIM[NALIZATION OF
ALCOHOUSM-ALCOHOLISM AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL LIABiLITy.
On January 1, 1975, the Washington State Uniform Alcoholism
and Intoxication Treatment Act (the Act)' became effective.2 It directs
that treatment replace punishment3 as the appropriate mechanism for
dealing with alcoholics and intoxicated persons. The Act repeals or
amends all criminal law provisions relating to public drunkenness4
and mandates a comprehensive treatment program for persons with
alcohol problems.5 This note examines the mechanics of the Wash-
ington Act and the legislative determination that alcoholism is a dis-
ease and that the drinking it induces is beyond the control of the alco-
holic. Consideration is given to whether Washington law can consist-
ently treat chronic alcoholism as a disease for purposes of dealing
with the public inebriate while continuing to hold that the intoxication
of an alcoholic is a voluntary condition for purposes of criminal pros-
ecution. Finally, a rule is formulated to accommodate both the disease
concept of alcoholism and principles of criminal culpability.
1. Ch. 122, [1972] Wash. Laws IstEx.Sess.297,asamended, Ch. 175, [1974] Wash:
Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 620. The Act is codified in WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70.96A (1974).
2. The Act was originally scheduled to become effective on January 1, 1974. Ch. 122,
§ 31, [1972] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 315. The effective date was subsequently changed
to January 1, 1975. Ch. 92, § 1, [1973] Wash. Laws 249.
3. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.96A.010 (1974).
4. See, e.g., ch. 122, § 26(25), [1972] Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 313, repealing
ch. 23, § 1, [ 1909] Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 61 (emphasis added) which had provided:
Any person who shall use in the presence of any person any indecent or vulgar
language, or who shall appear upon any public road or street or in any or upon
any public place or conveyance in any indecent, drunken or maudlin condition or
boisterous manner shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished accordingly.
Ch. 122, § 29, [1972] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 313, amends ch. 112, § 1, [1965]
Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 2053 by deleting subsection (4) which provided:
Every-
(4) Common drunkards [sic] found in any place where intoxicating liquors are sold
or kept for sale, or in an intoxicated condition;
is a vagrant, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than six months, or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars.
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.190 (1974) provides:
(1) No county, municipality, or other political subdivision may adopt or enforce a
local law, ordinance, resolution, or rule having the force of law that includes drinking,
being a common drunkard, or being found in an intoxicated condition as one of the
elements of the offense giving rise to a criminal penalty or sanction.
5. WASH. REV. CODE §'70.96A.080 (1974).
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I. LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PUBLIC
DRUNKENNESS: ABANDONING THE
"CRIMINAL" CONCEPT
Until 1968, every state had criminal statutes providing for punish-
ment of public drunkenness. 6 The number of persons arrested under
these statutes has been enormous. In 1965, two million arrests, one of
every three arrests in the United States, were for public inebriation.7
The great majority of persons arrested for public intoxication are
chronic alcoholics. 8 The considerable medical authority that chronic
alcoholics are suffering from a disease 9 prompted proponents of decrim-
inalization of public intoxication to argue that public drunkenness
6. HEW, FIRST SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH
89 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT]. In April, 1968, Hawaii became the first
state to legislatively abolish the offense ofpublic intoxication. HEW REPORT 90. See Act 6.
11968] Hawaii Laws 7, repealing HAWAII REV. STAT. § 737-1 (1968).
7. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 233 (1967). For the dimensions
of the Washington problem, see the statistics cited in Morris, Overcriminalization alnd
Washington's Revised Criminal Code, 48 WASH. L. REV. 5, 13-14 (1972). Twelve thou-
sand of Seattle's arrests each year involve violations of public drunkenness statutes.
In 1967 this amounted to more than one-half of all arrests. J. SPRADLEY, YOU OWE
YOURSELF A DRUNK 9 (1970). In 1970. Spokane police arrested 6,989 persons on
drunkenness charges. This figure represents almost 69% of that city's 10,156 arrests
in 1970. Interview with James Read, Chief Booking Officer with the Spokane City-
County Jail, in Spokane, Washington, Nov. 18, 1971.
8. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND. ALCOHOLISM AND
INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT 38 (1969).
9. As early as 1956, the American Medical Association's Council on Mental Health
recognized alcoholism as an illness. Report of the Board of Trustees, 162 J.A.M.A. 749,
750 (1956). A review of the leading literature on the subject of alcoholism yields the
following definitions:
Alcoholism is a psychogenic dependence on or a physiological addiction to ethanol.
manifested by the inability of the alcoholic consistently to control either the start of
drinking or its termination once started ....
Keller, Definition of Alcoholism, 21 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 125. 127 (1960) (footnotes
omitted).
Alcoholism is a chronic disorder in which the individual is unable, for psychological or
physical reasons, or both, to refrain from the frequent consumption of alcohol in
quantities sufficient to produce intoxication and, ultimately injury to health and
effective functioning.
H. MILT, BASIC HANDBOOK ON ALCOHOLISM 7 (1967).
[Alcoholism] is a disease combining physical and emotional factors. It is a disease
similar in many ways to any other addiction to a drug or chemical. As a result.
the person with alcoholism loses control over when he drinks, how much he drinks.
and where he drinks.
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM, THE MODERN APPROACH TO ALCOHOLISM 6 (1965).
For an exhaustive discussion and development of the disease concept of alcoholism.
see E. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM (1960). See also N. KESSELL &
H. WALTON, ALCOHOLISM (1965); J. MILAM, THE EMERGENT COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF
ALCOHOLISM (revised ed. 1972). But see Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of
a Factual Foundationfor the "Disease Concept of Alcoholism," 83 HARV. L. REV. 793,
809-12(1970).
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statutes unjustly and illogically punish a sick person for his or her ill-
ness. 10 The serious drains on police and judicial resources resulting
from enforcement of public drunkenness laws,1 ' and the arguments in
favor of treating public intoxication as a health rather than as a crime
problem, provided the impetus for the movement to decriminalize
public intoxication. 12
Congress endorsed the concept that alcoholism is a health, not a
criminal law, problem in the Alcoholic and Narcotic Addict Rehabili-
tation Act of 1968.13 In 1971 the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Alcoholism and
Intoxication Treatment Act (the Uniform Act)14 to include a noncrim-
inal approach to the problem of public drunkenness. Washington
and 14 other states have adopted the Uniform Act.15
10. See, e.g., T. PLAUT, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS 110 (1967); Hutt, The Recent Court
Decisions on Alcoholism: A Challenge to the North American Judges Association and
Its Members, in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 118-19 (1967).
11. In Seattle, for example, 70% of all police duty-hours in 1967 were spent on
drunkenness offenses and 80% of the jail population during the same year were
"chronic alcoholic offenders." SPRADLEY, supra note 7, at 9. In Spokane, Washington,
approximately 14,000 duty-hours per year were devoted to processing drunks in 1970.
Interview with James Read, supra note 7. In 1967, 65% of the cases handled in Seattle
Municipal Court involved charges of public drunkenness. SPRADLEY, supra note 7, at 10.
12. See, e.g., Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACADEMY 157 (1967); Morris, Overcriminalization and Washington's Revised Criminal
Code, 48 WASH. L. REV. 5, 11 (1972).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2688(e) et seq. (1970).
14. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT (1971). The National Institute of
Mental Health has also endorsed a model act. See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT (1969).
15. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.37.010 et seq. (Supp. 1974); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 36-2021 et seq. (1974); Colorado Alcoholism & Intoxication Treatment Act, ch. 221,
[1973] Colo, Laws 783; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 33 17-155k et seq. (Supp. 1975);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 396.012 et seq. (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-3901 et seq. (Supp.
1974, effec. July 1, 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-13-6.1-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1974);
KAN. STAT. ANN. 33 65-4001 et seq. (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 7101 et
seq. (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 69-6203 et seq. (Supp. 1974); N.Y.
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW 33 35.01 et seq. (McKinney 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 33
40.1-4-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-20A-1 et seq. (Supp.
1974); Wisconsin Alcoholism & Intoxication Treatment Act, cl. 198, [1973] Wis.
Laws 58.
Twenty-five states, although not adopting the Uniform Act, have enacted alcoholism
treatment acts: ALA. CODE tit. 52, §§ 546(2) et seq. (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 83-709 et seq. (Supp. 1973); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5170 et seq. (West
Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4210 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. §3 334-1 et
seq. (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 911/2, §§ 100-10 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1966);
IOwA CODE ANN. 33 123B.1 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 222.011 et
seq. (1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1751 et seq. (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 2C, 3 101 et seq. (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 33 I IB:I et seq.
(Supp. 1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. 33 18.1031(11) et seq. (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN.
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II. THE MECHANICS OF THE WASHINGTON ACT
Consistent with the Uniform Act, the Washington statute estab-
lishes a screening mechanism designed to separate alcoholics from
nonalcoholics. Both the alcoholic and nonalcoholic are excused from
criminal liability for public intoxication, 16 but only the alcoholic is
forced into the treatment system and afforded extended attention.1 7
Under the Washington Act, an "intoxicated person,"'18 whether an
alcoholic or a nonalcoholic, may be taken into custody by police for a
§§ 254A.01 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-31-I et seq. (1972); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 458.250 et seq. (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 172:2-a et seq.
(Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-14-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
122-35.13 et seq. (1974 replacement vol.); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3720.01 et seq.
(Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2101 et seq. (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 430.260 et seq. (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1690.101 et seq. (Supp.
1974); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1000.21 et seq. (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-
801 et seq. (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-43-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.010 (1974). The Act makes this clear by restricting
the powers of other governmental units to punish public intoxication as well as amending
the state criminal code. See note 4 supra.
Arguably, the Washington statute provides a windfall to the casual drinker who
appears intoxicated in public: such a person is saved from criminal prosecution because of
the public's growing concern with the grave problem of chronic alcoholism. There is no
reason to believe that the former criminal penalties did not deter the nonalcoholic drinker
from appearing in public after becoming intoxicated. These nonalcoholics escape criminal
liability for public intoxication due to administrative expediency rather than any doctrinal
analysis which dictates their exculpation. On the other hand, the all-inclusive nature of
the Act may be applauded as a small, but significant, step in extricating government from
the questionable business of regulating private morality. See generally H. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
17. The same screening effect could be achieved without freeing the simple "intox-
icated person" from criminal liability. As to the generalized exculpation afforded by
the Act, see note 16 supra. Merely allowing a person to raise chronic alcoholism as a
defense to public drunkenness charges would accomplish the desired segregation of al-
coholics and nonalcoholics. However, proponents of the complete abolition of all
drunkenness offenses reject this case-by-case approach to the problem. They argue that
the criminal justice system is unable to efficiently separate the alcoholic in need of treat-
ment from the nonalcoholic:
While reasonable in theory, excusal from responsibility or prosecution of alcoholics
[for public intoxication offenses] creates many practical problems, because it requires
a diagnosis of alcoholism not for purposes of treatment, but rather to determine
whether a particular person should or should not be turned over to the police for
prosecution or should be convicted. In fact, the evidence is clear that the overwhelming
number of arrests for drunkenness offenses involve alcoholics, thus rendering the
selection process a relatively useless exercise. Since drunkenness per se has not been
shown to be a cause of crime or danger, the use of the criminal law in this instance
appears to be little more than a measure of moral control and urban esthetics,
unsupported by social need.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXI-
CATION TREATMENT ACT 38 (1969).
18. " 'Intoxicated person' means a person whose mental or physical functioning is
substantially impaired as a result of the use of alcohol." WASH. REV. CODE §
70.96A.020(9) (1974).
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brief period of time or assisted to his or her home only if "he [or she]
consents to the proffered help ... ."19 On the other hand, the police
or authorized emergency service patrols20 are required to take into
protective custody any "person incapacitated by alcohor' who is
found in a public place.21 The person may be held in custody for a
maximum of 48 hours unless a petition for involuntary commitment is
filed22 in which case he or she may be held for an additional 48 hours
pending a hearing. 23
If it is suspected that an incapacitated person is an alcoholic, the
individual in charge of a treatment facility may initiate the Act's
commitment process by filing a petition for commitment with a supe-
rior or district court.24 The petition must be accompanied by a li-
censed physician's supporting certificate and must allege:25
19. Id. § 70.96A.120(I) (1974).
20. Id. § 70.96A.170 (1974) authorizes the state, counties, cities and other
municipalities to:
establish or contract for emergency service patrols which are to be under the adminis-
tration of the appropriate jurisdiction. A patrol consists of persons trained to give
assistance in the streets and in other public places to persons who are intoxicated.
Members of an emergency service patrol shall be capable of providing first aid in
emergency situations and may transport intoxicated persons to their homes and to
and from treatment facilities.
21. [A] person who appears to be incapacitated by alcohol and who is in a public
place... shall be taken into protective custody ... and as soon as practicable, but in
no event beyond eight hours brought to an approved treatment facility for treatment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A. 120 (1974) (emphasis added).
"Incapacitated by alcohol" means that a person, as a result of the use of alcohol,
has his judgment so impaired that he is incapable of realizing and making a rational
decision with respect to his need for treatment and constitutes a danger to himself,
to any other person, or to property.
Id. § 70.96A.020(7) (1974). Compare the definition of "intoxicated person," note 18
supra.
The distinction between a "person incapacitated by alcohol" and an "intoxicated person"
is not at all clear. The police are left to their discretion in determining, for instance,
whether a person has his or her mental functioning "substantially impaired" by
alcohol (in which case the person cannot be taken forcibly into custody) or whether the
person's judgment is impaired to such an extent that he or she cannot make a "rational
decision" in which case the inebriate must be taken into custody. The Act appears to
recognize this police dilemma by specifically exculpating officers from liability for good
faith mistakes. Id. § 70.96A. 120(7) (1974).
Despite the mandate of the Act, Seattle police have apparently been unwilling to take
into protective custody persons who appear to be so incapacitated. Police have reportedly
been instructed not to provide "taxi service" to the King County detoxification unit.
Zoretich, Drama on the Night Patrol, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Feb. 28, 1975, at Al,
col. 1, A10, col. 2.
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.120(4) (1974).
23. ld.§ 70.96A.140(2).
24. Id. § 70.96A.140(1).
25. Id.
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that the person is an alcoholic who is incapacitated by alcohol, or that
the person is an alcoholic who has threatened, attempted, or inflicted
physical harm on another and is likely to inflict physical harm on an-
other unless committed.
If a person is adjudged an "alcoholic" at the commitment proceed-
ing,26 he or she may be retained in a treatment facility for a maximum
of 210 days. 27 The Act directs the State Department of Social and
Health Services to establish an alcoholism program28 and a compre-
hensive system of treatment facilities to provide rehabilitation services
to persons committed.2 9
Because only alcoholics are forced to undergo treatment, it is clear
that the alcoholic is the primary concern of the Act. For this reason,
the remainder of this note applies only to alcoholics. 30
III. TREATING ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE
The Washington Legislature's decision to treat rather than punish
publicly intoxicated alcoholics indicates that the legislature accepts
the "disease concept" of alcoholism and the basic premise upon which
the decriminalization of drunkenness is founded, 31 viz., it is unjust to
punish sick persons. 32 The notion that alcoholics are suffering from
26. The Act includes procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the alleged alcoholic
during the judicial proceeding held to test the sufficiency of the commitment petition.
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A. 140(10) (1974). A full discussion of the adequacy of these
procedures is beyond the scope of this note. However, it should be recognized that any
significant deprivation of liberty, whether it be effected through "criminal" or "civil"
procedures, may raise due process issues. The line between "treatment" and "punish-
ment" is often a thin one; it has even been suggested that the alcoholic may possess a
right to the "pursuit of unhappiness." H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 347 (1968).
It may prove fruitful to compare the procedural safeguards of the Act with those
relating to civil commitment of the mentally ill. For a recent discussion of Washington's
mental commitment laws, see Comment, Progress in Involuntary Commitment, 49
WASH. L. REV. 617 (1974). The Washington court has demanded strict adherence to the
principles of due process in civil mental commitment proceedings. See, e.g., In reQuesnell, 83 Wn. 2d 224. 517 P.2d 568 (1973); In re Levias, 83 Wn. 2d 253, 517 P.2d
588 (1973).
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.140 (1974).
28. Id. § 70.96A.030.
29. Id. § 70.96A.080.
30. An additional reason for confining the scope of the note to alcoholics is that there
is no basis either in the Act or its legislative history to support a new complete defense
to criminal charges for the nonalcoholic. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text infra.
31. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
32. See, e.g., statement of Senator Gissberg:
To provide the funds to provide separate facilities and approved facilities in
terms of hospitalization and so on is going to require some money to do it but
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an illness is evident throughout the Washington Act.33 Alcoholics are
consistently referred to as "patients"; 34 their treatment may not be
provided at a jail or prison,35 nor may they be deprived of treatment
on account of a "relapse."36 The Act mandates programs for the pre-
vention of alcoholism 37 and directs the Department of Social and
Health Services to "encourage all health and disability insurance pro-
grams to include alcoholism as a covered illness. ''3s
I subscribe to the whole concept that there should not be criminal sanctions
against a person who is ill.
WASH. S. JOUR. 307 (1972) (emphasis added). Acknowledgment of alcoholism as a health
problem follows the findings of the medical profession, see note 9 supra, and of the
United States Congress. Congress endorsed the concept that alcoholism is a health, not a
criminal law, problem inthe Alcoholicand Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1968.42
U.S.C. §§ 2688(e) et seq. (1970). The Act added a new section to The Community
Mental Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2681 et seq. (1970):
§ 240 (a) The Congress hereby finds that-(1) Alcoholism is a major health and
social problem afflicting a significant proportion of the public, and much more needs
to be done by public and private agencies to develop effective prevention and control.
3)" The handling of chronic alcoholics within the system of criminal justice er-
petuates and aggravates the broad problem of alcoholism whereas treating it as
a health problem permits early detection and prevention of alcoholism and ef-
fective treatment and rehabilitation relieves police and other law enforcement
agencies of an inappropriate burden that impedes their important work and
better serves the interests of the public.
82 Stat. at 1005-06.
Moreover, by shifting the emphasis of public inebriate control from punishment
to treatment, Washington qualifies for federal grants under the Comprehensive
Alcohol Abuse & Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment & Rehabilitation Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 4551 et seq. (1970). The Act appropriated $180 million for grants to aid
states in the" development of treatment programs for alcoholics and alcohol abusers. Id.
§ 4571. As a condition precedent to the receipt of grant funds, a state must adopt a
comprehensive plan for the treatment of alcohol-related problems. Id. § 4573. The
availability of these federal funds was an important motivating factor in the adoption
of the Washington Act. See WASH. S. JOUR. 309 (1972).
33. In theAct's policystatement, thelegislature made itclear that alcoholics arepersons
in need of treatment, not punishment:
It is the policy of this state that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be
subjected to criminal prosecution solely because of their consumption of alco-
holic beverages but rather should be afforded a continuum of treatment in
order that they may lead normal lives as productive members of society.
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.010 (1974).
In ordinary language, "treatment" usually implies the presence of a disease. The
floor debates on the Act indicate that the legislature, too, was using "treatment" in
this sense. See note 32 supra. It is possible, however, to construe "treatment" in the
broader sense of "rehabilitation," a term which encompasses defects in character as well
as physical diseases. Some states have avoided this ambiguity by explicitly declaring
alcoholism to be a disease. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 396.022 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 2C, § 103(d) (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 69-6211 (Supp. 1974);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 430.315 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-802 (Supp. 1974).
34. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.96A.100(l), .110(3), .150, .180 (1974).
35. Id. § 70.96A.080(3).
36. Id. § 70.96A.100(3).
37. Id. § 70.96A.050(1).
38. Id. § 70.96A.050(16).
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The Act's definition of an alcoholic is also consistent with the dis-
ease concept of alcoholism: 39
"Alcoholic" means a person who habitually lacks self-control as to the
use of alcoholic beverages, or uses alcoholic beverages to the extent
that his [or her] health is substantially impaired or endangered or
his [or her] social or economic function is substantially disrupted.
This definition incorporates two essential characteristics of the disease
of chronic alcoholism, habituation and ineffective functioning.40
Since diseases and their immediate behavioral consequences are
normally viewed as nonvolitional, 41 the legislature's recognition of
the disease concept of alcoholism is, in effect, a declaration that an
alcoholic's intoxication is involuntary.42 While such a declaration has
little impact upon the operation of the Act itself, it may have a tre-
mendous impact upon the criminal law, which demands the existence
of a voluntary act 43 before criminal liability can be imposed. This
potential impact prompts an examination of the dilemmas which the
Washington Act may raise for the courts in confronting the issue of
criminal responsibility.
IV. THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE CHRONIC
ALCOHOLIC
The criminal law has traditionally classified drunkenness as a vol-
39. Id. § 70.96A.020(1). This definition creates some interpretive problems. The
use of the disjunctive conjunction "or" introduces a certain ambiguity because when the
term "alcoholic" is used in subsequent parts of the Act, no indication is given concerning
the proper alternative definition to be employed. The official comments to the Uniform
Act, while not entirely clear on this point, indicate that the first alternative definition
should be used in determining questions of criminal responsibility while the second
definition should be used to determine whether a person should be encouraged to seek
voluntary treatment. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT, Comments to § 2.
The Wisconsin Treatment Act eliminates these problems by substituting "and" for "or"
in its definition of "alcoholic." See Wisconsin Alcoholism & Intoxication Treatment
Act, ch. 198, § 19(2) (a), [1973] Wis. Laws 63.
40. H. MILT, BASIC HANDBOOK ON ACOHOLIsM 7 (1967).
41. See Keller, Definition of Alcoholism, 21 Q.J. STUD. ALCOHOL 125, 133 (1960).
42. This analysis was developed in Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th
Cir. 1966). Because the alcoholic is addicted to alcohol, he or she cannot stop drinking
before becoming intoxicated. T. PLALT, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS 39 (1967). See also United
States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973); N. KESSEL & H. WALTON, ALCOHOLISM 16 (1965).
For a criticism of the view that addiction is an involuntary state, see Fingarette, Addiction
and Criminal Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1975).
43. See, e.g,, R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 749 (2d ed. 1969).
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untarily induced condition.44 Except for the rarely used category of
involuntary intoxication, 45 the criminal law has not recognized intoxi-
cation as a complete defense to criminal offenses but only as a miti-
gating circumstance for crimes requiring specific intent.46 With the
Washington Legislature's acceptance of the disease concept of alco-
holism in the Act, it may be argued that the alcoholic should be able
to assert a defense of "not guilty by reason of intoxication induced by
alcoholism." Whether a defense will be recognized depends upon the
weight courts give to the legislature's acceptance of the disease con-
cept of alcoholism.
A. Legislative Action
The legislature did not specify the effect of the Act on the criminal
law. Legislative debates and the statutory language, however, indicate
that the legislature was concerned about the Act's impact upon lia-
bility for criminal acts allegedly committed by inebriates. It was clearly
stated in legislative debates that an intoxicated person who is not an
alcoholic cannot raise his or her inebriation as a defense to charges of
serious offenses.47 The specific rejection of the intoxication defense
44. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 559-60 (1961).
45. The traditional categories ofinvoluitary intoxication are intoxication by mistake,
by fraud, from medication and under duress. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 895-97
(2d ed. 1969). See note 93 infra. The author of this note did not find any Washington
case in which the accused asserted the defense of involuntary intoxication.
46. See WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 568-72. The following provision of the
Washington Criminal Code is typical of the traditional treatment of intoxica-
tion:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be
deemed less criminal by reason of his [or her] condition, but whenever the actual
existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to
constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his [or her] intoxication
may be takeninto consideration in determining such purpose, motive, or intent.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.01.114 (1974).
While the traditional involuntary intoxication defense requires the existence of some
element external to the intoxicated person, e.g., fraud or duress, in order to establish
a lack of volition, see note 45 supra, the proposed new defense rests upon the notion
that volition can just as easily be destroyed by disease. In the leading case, State v.
Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869), Judge Charles Doe recognized that disease as well as ex-
ternal force can constitute duress:
When disease is the propelling, uncontrollable power, the man is as innocent as the
weapon .... If his mental, moral, and bodily strength is subjugated and pressed
to an involuntary service, it is immaterial whether it is done by his disease, or by
another man, or a brute or any physical force of art or nature set in operation
without any fault on his part.
Id. at 441.
47. Senator Rasmussen: "... Did I understand you correctly that a bunch of
the boys get whooping it up, breaking things up, and all that the police officer is
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for nonalcoholics, coupled with silence about the availability of the
defense for alcoholics, arguably supports the view that the legislature
intended that the defense be available to alcoholics charged with se-
rious offenses. 48
The Act contains specific declarations that it does not affect the
criminality of only two types of offenses: driving while intoxicated
and offenses relating to the sale and possession of alcoholic bev-
erages.49 The unequivocal statement that the Act does not establish a
defense of alcoholism for these offenses may indicate a legislative in-
tent to allow an alcoholism defense to be raised against offenses not
specified in the Act.50
expected to do is take them by the hand and put them to bed and not in the calaboose?"
Senator Holman: "Senator Rasmussen, I am trying to differentiate between some
one of the boys whooping it up and an alcoholic whooping it up. This bill is not
for any normal person who goes out on a party and gets intoxicated."
Senator Washington: "Senator Holman, if someone is intoxicated and still commits
a crime, whether they commit assault or whether they commit battery, whether they
rob or are violent and commit crimes in that fashion, this is not going to be a
defense of that crime .... The usual drunk and disorderly would perhaps be out
the window. But these violent things ... certainly would still be crimes."
Senator Holman: "You are correct."
WASH. S. JOUR. 308 (1972) (emphasis added). Even if the foregoing language were
construed to apply to alcoholics as well as to the more generalized class of "intoxicated
persons," some meaning must still be attributed to the provision in §19 authorizing
the use of evidence of intoxication as a "defense." See note 51 and accompanying text
infra. It is well established in Washington law that every term of a statute should
be given meaning and effect. See, e.g., Connolly v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles. 79
Wn. 2d 500, 487 P.2d 1050 (1971); Jordan v. O'Brien. 79 Wn. 2d 406, 486 P.2d
290 (1971); Murray v. Department of Labor & Indus., 151 Wash. 95. 275 P. 66 (1929):
Northern Pacific R.R. v. Snohomish County, 101 Wash. 686, 172 P. 878 (1918).
48. The legislature's silence with respect to the alcoholic's responsibility may imply an
acquiscence to Senator Gissberg's statement that the Act will "treat alcoholics as no longer
violating the criminal statutes in this state except in the case of drunk driving which is
not removed at all." WASH. S. JOUR. 307 (1972) (emphasis added).
49. Section 19(3) of the Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter affects any law, ordinance, resolution, or rule against
drunken driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, or other similar offense
involving the operation of a vehicle, aircraft, boat, machinery, or other equipment,
or regarding the sale, purchase, dispensing, possessing, or use of alcoholic beverages
at stated times and places or by a particular class of persons; nor shall evidence of
intoxication affect, other than as a defense, the application of any law, ordinance.
resolution, or rule to conduct otherwise establishing the elements of an offense.
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A. 190(3) (1974). Compare § 19(c) of the Uniform Act:
(c) Nothing in this Act affects any law, ordinance, resolution, or rule against drunken
driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, or other similar offense involving
the operation of a vehicle, aircraft, boat, machinery, or other equipment, or regarding
the sale, purchase, dispensing, possessing, or use of alcoholic beverages at stated
times and places or by a particular class of persons.
UNIFORM ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT § 19(c).
50. This conclusion follows from an application of the familiar canon of statutory
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In one of the few major departures from the Uniform Act, Section
19 of the Washington Act provides, inter alia:51
[N] or shall evidence of intoxication affect, other than as a defense, the
application of any law, ordinance, resolution, or rule to conduct other-
wise establishing the elements of an offense.
This pivotal language is susceptible of at least three interpreta-
tions. First, the provision may indicate that the recognition of alco-
holism as a disease will not significantly alter the execution of other
criminal laws. The provision may merely affirm the traditional view
that intoxication can serve as a partial defense to crimes requiring
specific intent.5 2 This interpretation is unsatisfactory, however, be-
cause it presupposes that the legislature can define alcoholism as a
disease for the purposes of one aspect of the law but continue to treat
it as volitional behavior for all others. 53
Second, the provision may imply a new complete defense against
criminal charges. This view is supported by the fact that the Act's
definition of "alcoholic" recognizes the nonvolitional character of
construction, expressio unius estexclusioalterius; i.e., whereastatutespecificallydesignates
the things to which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions were intended by
the legislature. This rule of statutory construction is well established in Washington
law. See, e.g., State v. Roadhs, 71 Wn. 2d 705, 430 P.2d 586 (1967); Bradley v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn. 2d 780, 329 P.2d 196 (1958); State ex rel.
Port of Seattle v. Department of Pub. Serv., 1 Wn. 2d 102, 95 P.2d 1007 (1939).
The legislature could have easily included a provision stating that the Act would not
affect the application of any criminal law. Compare § 19 of Georgia's treatment act:
Nothing in this Chapter affects any law, ordinance, resolution, or rule against
drunken driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, or other similar offense...
or any other criminal act.
GA. CODE ANN. § 99-3919(b) (Supp. 1974, effec. July 1, 1975) (emphasis added).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.190(3) (1974) (emphasis added). This portion of
§ 19 was added to the end of § 19 of the Uniform Act. See note 49 supra.
52. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. Had the Washington Legislature
merely intended to preserve intoxication as a partial defense, a specific provision so
stating could have been added to the statute. Compare the Alaska Treatment Act's
specific provision relating to this problem: "Nothing in this chapter affects AS 11.70.030,
relating to the defense of voluntary intoxication." ALASKA STAT. § 47.37.250(b) (Supp.
1974). (AS § 11.70.030 is in substance identical to WASH. REV. CODE § 9.01.114 (1974),
cited in note 46 supra.)
53. Section I of the Act lends some support to this interpretation: "[A] lcoholics ...
may not be subjected to criminal prosecution solely because of their consumption
of alcoholic beverages." WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.010 (1974) (emphasis added).
Arguably, this language means that the Act does not affect aspects of the criminal law
beyond the public intoxication offense. But see notes 48--51 and accompanying text supra,
and text accompanying notes 88-92 infra. For an expanded discussion of the argument
that definitions used in social welfare statutes should not affect the criminal law, see
notes 69-73 and accompanying text infra.
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chronic alcoholism. 5 4 For reasons developed later in this note,5 5 it is
submitted that this interpretation should be rejected because it would
provide an ill-advised principle of blanket exculpation for all criminal
acts committed by alcoholics.
Finally, a third interpretation falling between these extremes is
that the legislature intended alcoholism to be recognized as an invol-
untary condition which may or may not support a complete defense
depending upon the particular case.56 Such an interpretation makes
possible the formulation of an independent criminal law definition
which incorporates the Act's disease concept rationale, but avoids a
principle of complete exculpation for all alcoholics.5 7
Unfortunately, neither the Act nor its legislative history indicates
with certainty which of the above interpretations of Section 19 is ac-
curate. The Washington court appears free to accept or reject the ap-
plicability of the Act's disease concept of alcoholism to the criminal
law. It is submitted, however, that the court should adopt the third
interpretation and recognize intoxication induced by alcoholism as a
complete defense in some cases. This suggested approach is discussed
in Part V infra.58
54. Alcoholic means a person who habitually lacks self-control as to the use of
alcoholic beverages, or uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that his health is
substantially impaired or endangered or his social or economic function is substan-
tially disrupted.
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.020(l) (1974) (emphasis added). For an examination of
the broader implications of this argument, see notes 77-79 and accompanying text infra.
Proponents of a narrower reading of § 19 may point to the second half of the de-
finition of "alcoholic" and argue that the legislature intended only to adopt a psycho-
logical definition of alcoholism which does not necessarily imply a lack of volition.
See Fingarette, supra note 42, at 436-37. The psychological view of alcoholism has
been condemned as "errant nonsense." J. MILAM, THE EMERGENT COMPREHENSIVE
CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 3 (revised ed. 1972). For a discussion of the ambiguities of
the Act's definition of "alcoholic," see note 39 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 87-89 infra.
56. This recognizes that alcoholism is a disease possessing indicia of both volitional
and nonvolitional conduct. In a given alcoholic at a given time, either the volitional or the
nonvolitional aspects of the disease may predominate. As the disease progresses, the
episodes during which the alcoholic lacks self-control become more frequent. See H. MILT,
BASIC HANDBOOK ON ALCOHOLISM 25-26 (1967). See also E. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE
CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 45-46 (1960).
57. This interpretation relies upon the overall structure and purpose of the Act
rather than upon any individual term in the language of § 19. See Part V infra. It also
receives textual support from the Act's two-pronged definition of "alcoholic." In fact, the
concept of "semi-voluntary disease" may relieve the tensions created by that definition's
blending of physiological and psychological concepts. See notes 39 & 54 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra.
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B. Possible Judicial Responses to the Legislative Action
The clearest expression of the Washington court's views on the na-
ture of alcoholism and its relation to the criminal laws prior to any
legislative direction in the area is found in Seattle v. Hill.59 In that
case, the court recognized that chronic addictive alcoholism could be
viewed as a disease for medical purposes, but concluded that the alco-
holic still possessed the capacity to refuse to drink and, thus, could
legitimately be punished under a city ordinance against pilblic drunk-
enness.60 Significantly, the court indicated that if the judiciary adopted
the view that alcoholics lack the power to refrain from drinking, it
would be required to recognize a new defense relieving chronic alco-
holics of responsibility for all criminal acts.6 1
Other courts have agreed that a judicial recognition of the disease
concept of alcoholism would introduce a new complete defense into
the criminal law. The Alaska Supreme Court, for example, suggests
that any court which recognizes an alcoholic's intoxication as involun-
tary would be compelled to establish a new principle of criminal ex-
culpation.62 Indeed, uneasiness over the ramifications of declaring the
public intoxication of an alcoholic to be the symptom of an involun-
tary disease appears to have been a major factor in the United States
Supreme Court's refusal in Powell v. Texas63 to invalidate public
drunkenness statutes as applied to chronic alcoholics. In Powell, the
59. 72 Wn. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 872 (1968).
60. Id. at 802, 435 P.2d at 702.
61. If we were to . . . [relieve) chronic alcoholics of responsibility for their
public misconduct while drunk, we would inevitably, under the same reasoning,
be forced to relieve them of the legal consequences of other crimes committed
while under the influence of voluntarily consumed intoxicants.
Id. at 797, 435 P.2d at 700. The court included mere public intoxication in the term
"misconduct." Mr. Hill was intoxicated in public, but nothing more. "[T] he defendant
was not disorderly; neither was he noisy, boisterous, belligerent nor profane; he was
not assaultive or promoting a commotion." Id. at 788, 435 P.2d at 695.
62. One suffering from the disease of alcoholism has a compulsion to drink
and to get drunk in public, and since this compulsion is said [by proponents of
the disease concept of alcoholism] to be irresistible and not the product of the
exercise of one's will, it is said he cannot be held criminally responsible for pub-
lic drunkenness. The inevitable result of such a holding is that the chronic al-
coholic would also have to be relieved of the legal consequences of other crimes
committed while under the influence of alcohol. One may not escape that con-
clusion.
Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342, 344 (Alas. 1969) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
See also In re Spinks, 253 Cal. App. 748, 61 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1967).
63. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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Court held that a chronic alcoholic's appearance in public was a vol-
untary act and therefore constituted "conduct" properly punishable
under the criminal law.64
Although the judiciary has been reluctant to reformulate its
thinking about the nature of alcoholism, the Washington Legislature's
recent adoption of the disease concept of alcoholism might compel the
Washington court to recognize alcoholism as an involuntary state.
There is case authority for either accepting or rejecting such a legisla-
tive determination.
In Easter v. District of Columbia,65 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia used a congressional act 66 declaring alcoholism
a disease as a basis for invalidating a statute which punished chronic
alcoholics for public intoxication. The court concluded that because
Congress had defined a "chronic alcoholic" as a person who "has lost
the power of self-control with respect to the use of such beverages," 67
general principles of criminal responsibility demanded acquittal of a
chronic alcoholic charged with drunkenness. 68
64. In ,"obinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). the Court had held un-
constitutional a California statute which made it a crime to be addicted to narcotics.
The Court found that the statute punished a status rather than conduct and, therefore.
violated the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality in Powell, concluded:
Ultimately. then, the most troubling aspects of this case, were Robinson to be
extended to meet it, would be the scope and content of what could only be a
constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility. In dissent it is urged that the
decision could be limited to conduct which is "a characteristic and involuntary
part of the pattern of the disease as it afflicts" the particular individual, and
that "f[it is not foreseeable" that it would be applied "in the case of offenses
such as driving a car while intoxicated, assault, theft, or robbery." That is limi-
tation by fiat. . . . [N]othing in the logic of the dissent would limit its applica-
tion . . . to chronic alcoholics ....
392 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
65. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
66. Act of Aug. 4, 1947, ch. 742, §§ 1-13, 61 Stat. 744 (amended 1968).
67. It should be noted that the court disregarded the alternative part of the
statutory definition which defined an alcoholic as one who while intoxicated en-
dangered the "public morals, health, safety, or welfare." 361 F.2d at 52.
68. 361 F.2d at 52. The court remarked: "An essential element of criminal re-
sponsibility is the ability to avoid the conduct specified in the definition of the crime.-
Id.
It should be emphasized that Easter also has an independent base in traditional
principles of criminal jurisprudence; the court's discussion of eighth amendment
grounds for overturning public drunkenness laws was merely an alternative justifica-
tion for the reversal of Easter's conviction. Id. at n.6. Thus, the court's conclusions
with respect to criminal responsibility are in no way altered by the Supreme Court's
subsequent rejection in Powell of eighth amendment attacks upon public intoxication
statutes. The Easter court was acting in its role as a developer of common law prin-
ciples of criminal culpability for the District of Columbia, and as such it stands in
the same position as does a state supreme court in shaping the law of its particular
jurisdiction.
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In contrast, the Georgia Supreme Court in Burger v. State69 un-
equivocally rejected the notion that the judiciary should be bound by
a legislative determination that a given condition is a disease. The
court refused to overturn a public intoxication statute even though
Georgia's alcoholism rehabilitation act70 defined alcoholism as an ill-
ness.71 The court questioned the power of the legislature to declare as
established a scientific fact lying within the realm of medicine.72 The
court expressed fear that the judiciary's acceptance of chronic alco-
holism as a defense to a charge of drunkenness would open a "Pan-
dora's box" requiring the recognition of an "impulse" or "feeling of
compulsion" defense to all crimes-a development that would make a
shambles of the principles of criminal responsibility.73
It is submitted that the Washington court should incorporate into
the criminal law the legislative determination that alcoholism is a dis-
ease. First, the Washington court confronts a statutory scheme dif-
ferent from those present in Burger and Easter. In both cases, the
courts dealt with treatment acts which existed contemporaneously
with criminal law schemes allowing punishment for public intoxica-
tion. The Washington Act, however, simultaneously established a new
social services rehabilitation program and repealed criminal intoxica-
tion laws. The Act's treatment of alcoholism exclusively as a health,
not a criminal, problem7 4 militates strongly against the Washington
69. 118 Ga. App. 328, 163 S.E.2d 333 (1968); accord, People v. Hoy, 380 Mich.
597, 158 N.W.2d 436 (1968).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-401 (1971).
71. 163 S.E.2d at 335. The court reasoned:
While the Act of 1964 . . . does, for that purpose [alcoholism rehabilitation]
define alcoholism as an illness, it does not purport to and does not deal with
drunkenness as a crime or as a defense to acts which the law makes criminal.
Id. (emphasis added).
72. [I]t may be questioned as to whether the General Assembly can by its fiat
declare some physical status to be or not to be an illness. Is it within that body's
competence to establish or disestablish scientific facts? ... We believe that [the
establishment of medical facts] is a matter that must lie within the judgment of
the medical profession.
Id.
73. If chronic alcoholism or dipsomania is to be accepted as a defense to a
charge of drunkenness, would it not also be logical to accept it as a defense to a
charge of driving while drunk? ... And why not accept a plea of pyromania by
an arsonist, of kleptomania by a thief, of nymphomania by a prostitute, or a
similar plea of impulse and non-volitional action by the child molester? ... What
criminal conduct can be regulated or controlled if "impulse," a "feeling of com-
pulsion," or of "non-volitional action" arising out of these situations is to be
allowed as a defense. This Pandora's box had best be left alone for now.
Id.
74. See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra.
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court rejecting the disease concept of alcoholism. It should be noted,
however, that the question before the Washington court will not be
whether chronic alcoholism should be a defense to an appearance in
public while intoxicated, but whether it should be a defense to the
commission of other crimes while intoxicated. The stakes involved in
the question confronting the court are considerably higher than those
faced by courts before which decriminalization of public intoxication
alone is sought.
Second, in view of the Washington Supreme Court's conclusion in
HilF5 that a judicial finding that an alcoholic cannot be held respon-
sible for public intoxication would lead "inevitably" to a new theory
of inebriate exculpation,76 it would be highly inconsistent for the
court now to find that the legislature's decision to relieve chronic alco-
holics of responsibility for public intoxication has no impact upon
criminal liability.
V. THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW
Before criminal liability can attach, two elements must be proved:
actus reus (voluntary act) and mens rea (the evil, criminal intent).7 7 In
Seattle v. Hill, the Washington Supreme Court stated that the capacity
to avoid drinking and appearing in public while intoxicated is a com-
ponent of actus reus.78 The court's holding that such conduct is volun-
tary and may be punished is, of course, overruled by the Washington
Act's decriminalization of public intoxication. However, the court's
75. 72 Wn. 2d 786, 435 P.2d 692 (1967).
76. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
77. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 740-42 (2d ed. 1969).
78. 72 Wn. 2d at 794, 435 P.2d at 698. Justice Hale reasoned:
If he possessed the capability of avoiding public drunkenness, the other basic
component, that of actus reus, the volitional conduct, was thus present .... [In
this case] [bloth his drinking and being found drunk in public appear volitional
on his part under the law.
Id. (emphasis added). The leading case which analyzes the alcoholic's loss of self-
control in terms of an absence of actus reus is Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th
Cir. 1966). See also Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alas. 1969).
Some courts have discussed an alcoholic's lack of self-control in terms of mens rea.
See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); People v. Hoy, 380 Mich. 597, 158
N.W.2d 436 (1968); Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
On balance, the actus reus analysis is superior. Quite clearly, if it is asserted that
a chronic alcoholic cannot control the intake of alcohol, then voluntariness, not intent,
is the critical issue to be examined. See Starrs, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism
and Traditional Criminal Law Theory, 19 S.C.L. REV. 349, 358 (1967).
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reasoning in Hill that a defendant's intoxication is to be analyzed in
terms of actus reus, not mens rea, should survive.
The fact that intoxication on the part of an alcoholic defendant
may negate actus reus and thus completely relieve criminal liability9
poses a dilemma which the Washington court must resolve if it wishes
to recognize alcoholism as a disease, yet stop short of providing a
complete defense to every person labeled a "chronic alcoholic." There
are two ways in which the court could resolve this dilemma. First, the
court could distinguish appearance in public while intoxicated from
other types of criminal conduct on the ground that only public intoxi-
cation is a "symptom" of the disease of chronic alcoholism. Alterna-
tively, the court could recognize alcoholism as an involuntary condi-
tion which may or may not provide a complete defense in a particular
case.
On behalf of the first approach, one might argue that the chronic
alcoholism defense should not be allowed for offenses other than
public intoxication, reasoning that public intoxication is a "symptom"
of alcoholism while other acts are not. In support of this position, Jus-
tice Finley, dissenting in Hill,80 argued that public intoxication is
compelled by addictive alcoholism but that crimes such as stealing
should not be characterized as being so compelled.8' Justice Hamil-
ton, in another dissenting opinion, agreed, stating that public intoxica-
tion is a passive "symptom '8 2 of alcoholism which can be relieved of
criminal culpability without accepting chronic addictive alcoholism as
"a complete defense to any and all other crimes."8 3
79. In Vick v. State, 453 P.2d 342 (Alas. 1969), the Alaska court outlined the
logical implications of a finding that an alcoholic lacks volitional control over his or
her drinking:
If the alcoholic's public display of drunkenness is not his act because he was
unable to resist the compulsion to drink to excess, then other things he does
while in that intoxicated state would also not be his act-would not be the
product of the exercise of his will. Thus, the person who becomes intoxicated
involuntarily would have to be excused for acts performed while intoxicated, such
as murder, rape, assault and battery and others.
Id. at 344.
80. 72 Wn. 2d at 804, 435 P.2d at 703.
81. Id.at817,435P.2dat7ll.
82. The majority explicitly rejected this characterization, pointing out that over
90% of the alcoholics in Seattle manage to stay out of public while intoxicated.
Id. at 794, 435 P.2d at 698.
83. Id. at 820, 435 P. 2d at 712. A similar analysis was employed by Justice For-
tas, dissenting in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 559 n.2 (1968):
It is not foreseeable that findings such as those which are decisive here-namely
that the defendant's being intoxicated in public was a part of the pattern of his
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Commentators have, with good cause, attacked the logic of the
"symptom" approach. The only inherent compulsive symptom of al-
coholism is the need to drink.84 There is a consensus that this need to
drink should not be punished. Once a court moves to exculpate con-
duct other than simple drinking, however, whether it be merely ap-
pearing in public or murder, the "symptom" rationale becomes inade-
quate.85 An exculpatory principle which extends to conduct other than
mere drinking must be grounded upon an absence of actus reus. And,
if the actus reus rationale is employed, there is no logical distinction to
be drawn between serious and nonserious crimes; if there is no act,
then there can be no crime. Principles of criminal responsibility de-
mand that if a person's act is involuntary by reason of alcoholism, lia-
bility should not be imposed regardless of the seriousness of the of-
fense.
By focusing upon individual offenders rather than upon broad clas-
sifications of diseases and offenses, the Washington court can escape
the dilemma of choosing between either total rejection of the disease
concept of alcoholism or total exculpation of all persons labeled "al-
coholics" by the Department of Social and Health Services. The prin-
ciple of criminal exculpation spawned by the disease concept of alco-
holism can be adequately limited if in each case the trier of fact is
required to determine: (1) whether the particular defendant was at the
time of the offense intoxicated to such an extent that he or she could
not have exercised the restraint necessary to avoid the alleged criminal
act; and (2) whether the defendant's intoxication was the product of
his or her inability to control the intake of alcohol by reason of
chronic alcoholism. 8 6 If both elements are found present, the de-
fendant should be excused of criminal liability regardless of the
gravity of the alleged offense. "Criminal liability should be keyed to
disease and due to a compulsion symptomatic of that disease-could or would
be made in the case of offenses such as driving a car while intoxicated, assault.
theft or robbery. Such offenses require independent acts or conduct and do not
typically flow from and are not part of the syndrome of the disease of chronic
alcoholism. If an alcoholic should be convicted for criminal conduct which is
not a characteristic and involuntary part of the pattern of the disease as it afflicts
him. nothing herein will prevent his punishment.
84. F. GRAD, A. GOLDBERG, & B. SHAPIRO, ALCOHOLISM AND THE LAW 139 (1971).
85. "[A] ppearing drunk in public is not necessarily any more 'symptomatic' of the
disease of alcoholism than is burglary committed by an alcoholic-the former is
merely more frequent." Id. at 140.
86. Kirbens. Chronic Alcohol Addiction and Criminal Responsibility, 54 A.B.A.J.
877, 881 (1968).
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the chronicity of the offender's alcoholism rather than to the artifi-
ciality of the classification of crimes."87
It is suggested that the necessity of focusing upon 'the volitional
content of each defendant alcoholic's acts can best be illuminated if
the court adopts the view that, although alcoholism is a disease, it
manifests itself in many different forms, not all of which entail a com-
plete obliteration of free will. The term "semivoluntary disease"
seems to best express this characteristic of alcoholism.
This case-by-case approach will allow the Washington court to
avoid the exculpation of all intoxicated alcoholics and yet remain con-
sistent with both the Act and the actus reus analysis of Hill. This
method was urged by Justice Hamilton in his dissent in Hill:8 8
Although the character of the malady [chronic addictive alcoholism],
and the dialogue surrounding it, tends to equate it with the seldom
recognized, yet existent, criminal defense of involuntary intoxication,
in my view, the malady still possesses sufficient facets of voluntariness
to subject the addict to criminal liability and punishment for activities
springing from and going beyond the basic symptoms of passive intox-
ication ....
Justice Hamilton's analysis serves to capsulize the dilemma the court
must resolve: intoxication induced by chronic alcoholism is similar to
the traditional defense of involuntary intoxication, yet not every alco-
holic should be excused from every crime. The only difficulty with
Justice Hamilton's position is that it tends to reject the view that the
alcoholic could suffer from a loss of volition in any instance. To solve
this problem, the case-by-case approach would focus upon the "fa-
cets of voluntariness" of the acts of each accused alcoholic.8 9
For an alcoholic defendant found so intoxicated at the time of the
alleged offense that his or her acts could not be considered voluntary,
counsel can most effectively articulate the defense in terms of automa-
87. Id.
88. 72 Wn. 2d at 820-21,435 P.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
89. In commenting upon the Hamilton dissent, Judge Samuel M. Kirbens of the
Denver County Court proposed the following procedure:
These "facets of voluntariness" should be considered by the trier of fact on a
defendant-by-defendant basis. Considering the present state of scientific expertise,
the alcoholic's exculpation from serious crime should be rare. The judiciary
should proceed at a calculated pace. Should the judge or jury be convinced, how-
ever, that any alcoholic defendant possessed no volitional control ... [t] he de-
fendant's acquittal could be justified pursuant to conventional criminal law ....
Kirbens, supra note 86, at 882.
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tism.90 Washington recognizes the defense of automatism9' but only if
the automatistic or unconscious state occurred involuntarily.92 Thus,
an automatism defense should prevail if it can be established that a
defendant's intoxication and consequent substantially impaired con-
sciousness resulted from his or her disease of alcoholism, i.e., involun-
tarily.
Structuring the defense in terms of automatism has several advan-
tages over the traditional approaches of involuntary intoxication93
90. [T] his term is applied to actions or conduct of an individual apparently
occurring without will, purpose, or reasoned intention on his part; a condition
sometimes observed in persons who, without being actually insane, suffer from
an obscuration of the mental faculties, loss of volition or of memory, or kindred
affections.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (4th ed. 1968). Automatism may serve as a complete
defense because, if established, it negatives proof of volition and consciousness, both
of which are necessary to establish any form of criminal liability. Edwards. Automa-
tisin and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MODERN L. REV. 375, 383-84 (1958).
Sleepwalking is the behavior pattern most widely associated with the defense of
automatism. Professor Glanville Williams suggests that there is no essential difference
between the conscious state of the sleepwalker and that of the inebriated drunkard.
He maintains that policy, not theory, justifies imposing liability upon the drunkard.
but not upon the sleepwalker. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART
12-13 (1961). See also Edwards, Automatism and Social Defense, 8 CRIM. L.Q. 258,
266 (1966).
91. See, e.g., State v. Welsh, 8 Wn. App. 719, 508 P.2d 1041 (1973) (error to
exclude evidence of psychomotor epilepsy because such evidence could establish
existence of an automatistic state negativing actus reus); State v. Utter, 4 Wn. App.
137, 479 P.2d 946 (1971) (an "act"" committed in an automatistic state is no act
at all).
92. See State v. Utter, 4 Wn. App. 137, 479 P.2d 946 (1971) (automatism does
not attain the stature of a complete defense when the state of unconsciousness is
voluntarily induced through the consumption of alcohol); accord, People v. Flowers.
38 Cal. App. 3d 813, 113 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1974).
93. Although the defense of involuntary intoxication has long been recognized in
the legal theory of criminal responsibility, the courts have been reluctant to apply it
in practice. In fact, one's efforts to discover a case in which the defense of involuntary
intoxication was successfully asserted will be in vain; there quite simply are none.
F. GRAD, A. GOLDBERG & B. SHAPIRO, ALCOHOLISM AND THE LAW 139 (1971); Paul-
sen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 18.
The courts have consistently held that to be truly involuntary, intoxication must be
the result of duress or fraud. In this area of the law, the courts have very strictly
construed the concept of duress. See, e.g., Burrows v. State. 38 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029
(1931), in which D, a college student, was a passenger in a car traveling through a
desert at night. The driver of the car threatened to eject D unless D drank intoxicating
liquor. D drank the liquor and killed the driver after having become intoxicated. The
Arizona court held that D's intoxication was not involuntary because D could have
left the car.
Given the very strict rules concerning the defense of involuntary intoxication, it
appears unwise for counsel to attempt this defense to exculpate a chronic addictive
alcoholic. Even the Model Penal Code retains the requirement that intoxication can
be involuntary only if not "self-induced." MODEL PENAL CODE, PROPOSED OFFICIAL
DRAFT § 2.08 (1962).
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and temporary insanity.9 4 Since the automatism defense is a relatively
new development, its use has the advantage of forcing courts into a
new mode of analysis; this is particularly important because of the
traditional judicial hostility to intoxication as a complete defense.
Because it serves to negative the actus reus, automatism may be the
defense best suited to focus upon the nonvolitional character of a
chronic alcoholic's drinking.95 Moreover, the Washington Act's defini-
tion of an alcoholic as one who cannot control alcohol consumption 96
lends support to this approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Washington State Legislature, responding to a growing body of
medical evidence, has seen fit to acknowledge the disease concept of
alcoholism in the Washington State Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxi-
cation Treatment Act. Consistent with the generally accepted view
that a sick person should not be punished for his or her illness, the Act
abolishes the crime of public intoxication. In so doing, the Act is con-
trary to the established prelegislation decisional law of this state. The
Washington court, although bound to accept the decriminalization of
public inebriation, must still decide whether the legislative determina-
tion that alcoholism is a disease compels the adoption of a new de-
fense of "not guilty by reason of intoxication induced by chronic alco-
holism." The court has three options: (1) extend a complete defense
for all crimes to any person who fits the Act's definition of "alcoholic";
(2) reject, as irrelevant to the criminal law, the Act's acceptance of the
disease concept of alcoholism; or (3) accept the disease concept while
rejecting the notion that every alcoholic lacks the volition necessary to
commit a criminal act. In making its choice, the Washington court
94. The temporary insanity approach has the disadvantage of confusing the
chronic alcoholic's incapacity to control drinking with a mens rea analysis. This
problem arises because the insanity defense is concerned with negating mens rea. See
discussion at notes 78-79 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the Washington
court has traditionally been very hostile to attempts to base an insanity defense upon
severe and prolonged intoxication. Only when such intoxication produces permanent
insanity will a defense be allowed. See, e.g., State v. Rio, 38 Wn. 2d 446, 230 P.2d
308 (1951); State v. Huey, 14 Wn. 2d 387, 128 P.2d 314 (1942); State v. Miller, 177
Wash. 442, 32 P.2d 535 (1934); State v. Brantley, If Wn. App. 716, 525 P.2d 813
(1974).
95. Starrs, supra note 78, at 366.
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.96A.020(1) (1974).
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should not allow the findings of medical science alone to dictate the
principles of criminal liability. It must be realized that the doctrine of
criminal responsibility is by its nature a complex concept which en-
compasses both legal and medical judgments. 97
The legal rules defining alcoholism should be sufficiently flexible to
allow the blending of medical and legal judgments. It is time to
abandon the rigid principle that a person's intoxication is always vol-
untary, and therefore irrelevant as a criminal defense unless brought
about by duress, fraud or mistake.98 But neither should the law adopt
an equally rigid principle that would completely exculpate any person
classified as an alcoholic by a medical expert.99 In short, medical evi-
dence should be relevant, but not controlling, in determining the guilt
of a defendant who was intoxicated at the time of his or her alleged
offense. 100
By adopting the third option, that alcoholism is a semivoluntary
disease, the court can acknowledge an alcoholism defense amenable
to legal principles and consistent with the findings of modem medi-
cine. Acceptance of the third option would preserve the legal system's
control over the determination of guilt or innocence, but not deny the
validity of either the disease concept of alcoholism or the Act's reha-
bilitative goals.
Fred A. Johnson
97. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
98. Other debilitating disease states are not rigidly defined as voluntary even
though they are the result of an unnecessary risk consciously taken by the victim.
For example, the insanity of the syphilitic defendant is considered involuntary even
though it is often the result of a voluntary act of sexual intercourse. See G. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 566 (1961).
99. Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger condemned this blind reliance upon the
categories of medical science, terming it "trial-by-label." Salzman v. United States,
405 F.2d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
100. In Salzrnan, 405 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1968), after he concluded that chronic
alcoholism was a disease which in some instances might control behavior, Judge J.
Skelly Wright suggested the following procedure for implementing an alcoholism
defense:
The rule I would fashion for alcoholism parallels this court's rule in the area of
insanity. The jury would be instructed that if it finds that the defendant was suf-
fering from a disease, it should find the defendent not guilty .... As with insanity.
labels should be avoided. In each case experts should not only identify the dis-
ease, but also the symptoms thereof and how the behavior of the defendant was
affected by his [or her] illness. Thus evidence that his [or her] action was not
a product would be particularized in each case.
Id. at 372-73 (concurring opinion, footnotes omitted).
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